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COMMENT
EXCLUSION OF COMMUNITY FACILITIES FOR
OFFENDERS AND MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS:
QUESTIONS OF ZONING, HOME RULE, NUISANCE,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
"'m frightened by the presence of the Ridgeview [home for former
mental patients]. I fear for my children's safety. "I
The program is "the most human way to get people back into society."2
"We believe in prison reform, but not on our block."'
In the last 17 years, the number of patients in Illinois mental insti-
tutions has decreased from 49,000' to 12,400.1 The 75 per cent drop does
not mean that Illinois has found the key to rapid restoration of mental
health. Rather, the decrease reflects a state policy, based on clinical'
and economic' considerations, of reducing the number of patients in
large, custodial institutions while developing community programs.' For
1. This comment was made by a woman who lives in Evanston, Illinois, one block from
the Ridgeview Sheltered Care Home. Ridgeview has 400 residents, about half of whom are
former mental patients. Abstract for Appellant at 164, City of Evanston v. Ridgeview
House, Inc., 64 Ill2d 40, 349 N.E.2d 399 (1976).
2. Dan Simons, Adult Service Administrator, Illinois Department of Corrections, of-
fered his opinion regarding a program for returning ex-convicts to the community through
work-release centers. Chicago Sun Times, July 17, 1975, at 35, col. 1.
3. A Chicago resident expressed his feeling about the opening of a work-release center,
housing 18 female ex-convicts, in his neighborhood. Chicago Tribune, July 30, 1975, §3,
at 1, col. 2.
4. ILIINOis DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, MENTAL
HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN ILLINOIS 2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DMH,
MENTAL HEALTHI.
5. Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, Monthly Sta-
tistical Report for January 1976.
6. "ITlreatment and care of most patients is optimally effective in the community."
DMH. MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 14, 25.
7. It costs $900 per month to keep a person with no major physical health problem in a
state custodial institution. Housing the same person in a community sheltered care home
costs about $450 per month-a savings of 50%. Interview with Jack Collier, Deputy Re-
gional Administrator for Institutional Services, Illinois Department of Mental Health, in
Chicago, Aug. 1, 1975. See also DMH, MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 25 n.17.
8. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, FIVE YEAR
PLAN, FY 1976-1980 11-2 (2d draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as DMH PLAN].
The shift is part of a national trend. In 1957 there were 546,927 persons in public
hospitals, nationwide, for treatment of mental illness. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T
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similar reasons, corrections officials are urging creation of more com-
munity facilities for offenders," although the shift of persons from pris-
ons -to community facilities is not nearly as dramatic as the shift of
mental patients."' A California corrections official estimates, "In excess
of 70 per cent of all offenders can be placed immediately in community-
based corrections activities.""
Fearing an influx of former mental patients and offenders, many com-
munities have attempted to ban the facilities which would house them
through zoning laws'" and nuisance litigation.'3 Attempts also have been
made to block such facilities through licensing,'4 community political
pressure,'5 and municipal ordinances which make operating a rehabili-
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 78 (1959). By the end of 1973,
the number of patients dropped to 248,562. Patients in private hospitals are not included
in the figures. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 83 (1974).
9. The correctional strategy with the most promise is reintegration of offenders into the
community. Community-based programs aid correction's goal of "restoring family ties;
obtaining employment and education; [and] securing in the larger sense, a place for the
offender in the routine functioning society." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 7, 28 (1967).
Community programs make parolees "more responsible." Interview with Fleming L. Wil-
liams, Assistant to the Administrator, Adult Field Services, Illinois Department of Correc-
tions, in Chicago, July 21, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Williams Interview I]. There are also
major economic advantages to community programs. It costs $11,000 per year to keep a
person in prison. The cost per person in a work-release program is $576. Chicago Sun
Times, July 17, 1975, at 35, col. 2.
10. In February 1976, there were 193 offenders in state-supervised community facilities
in Illinois, 163 in eight work-release centers and 30 in two state-operated facilities for
parolees. Many counties also operate community programs. The number of offenders in
state-supervised community programs has dropped by more than one-third since the
summer of 1975. The primary reason is a more stringent standard of eligibility for admit-
tance to work release programs which automatically excludes offenders who have com-
mitted certain crimes. Interview with Fleming L. Williams, Assistant to the Administra-
tor, Adult Field Services, Illinois Department of Corrections, in Chicago, Feb. 26, 1976
[hereinafter cited as Williams Interview II]. While the nature of an offender's crime is
relevant in considering whether a person should be admitted to a work-release program,
the standard ignores the more important factors of an offender's conduct in prison and
the likelihood he would benefit from the program.
11. Burdman, Realism in Community Based Correctional Services, 38 ANNALS 71
(1969). Milton Burdman is Deputy Director of the California Department of Corrections.
12. See note 29 infra.
1:3. See text accompanying notes 77-86 infra.
14. A city might impose such strict licensing requirements that it would be unprofitable
or nearly impossible for a private party to operate a shelter home, or a city might require
a shelter home to hire a large staff of registered nurses even though the residents need
little medical care.
15. Several facilities for former prisoners were moved or not opened because of com-
munity pressure. Williams Interview I, supra note 9. In one case which received considera-
197611
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tation center a misdemeanor." Only recently have these issues been
litigated."
The exclusion of rehabilitation facilities raises questions of public
policy. There is a growing need for community facilities to reintegrate
former mental patients and offenders into society. Facilities also are
lacking for delinquent or dependent children, alcoholics, and drug abu-
sers." Effective community treatment programs not only will help the
individuals who are treated, but will save taxpayer dollars as well. On
the other hand, the presence of a facility for criminal offenders often
causes area residents to fear increased crime. ' Another commonly ex-
pressed apprehension is that a rehabilitation facility may alter the char-
acter of a residential neighborhood, resulting in lower property values.
The establishment of rehabilitation facilities also poses constitutional
and policy conflicts over which a governmental entity-the municipal-
ity, the state, or the judiciary-has the power to exclude or prevent the
exclusion of rehabilitation facilities.
This Comment will examine the methods by which municipalities
ble publicity, there was an uproar in a Chicago neighborhood over the opening of a work-
release center for 18 female ex-convicts. See Chicago Tribune, July 30, 1975, §3, at 3, col.
1. Following one month of community pressure and threatened litigation, the Illinois
Department of Corrections moved the work-release center back to its former location. See
Chicago Sun Times, Aug. 13, 1975, at 57, col. 1.
16. Hepper v. Town of Hillsdale, 63 Misc.2d 447, 311 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 1970),
struck down an ordinance which made it a misdemeanor to operate a drug abuse treat-
ment center. The ordinance was passed three days after plans for the center were an-
nounced. The court said the ordinance "is obviously inconsistent with the organic law of
the state and, therefore, is unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive to a valid state pur-
pose." Id. at 451, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
17. In 1974, an Illinois appellate court found that a home for former mental patients
was compatible with and should be allowed in a business district. Hazel Wilson Hotel
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 17 Ill.App.3d 415, 308 N.E.2d 372 (1st Dist. 1974). For the first
time this year in City of Evanston v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 64 Ill.2d 40, 349 N.E.2d 399
(1976), the Illinois Supreme Court considered the constitutional issues involved in the
exclusion of rehabilitation facilities. See notes 104-111 and accompanying text infra.
18. The Illinois Drug Abuse Program (IDAP) operates six outpatient clinics and two
residential centers. IDAP also funds 30 contractual facilities. In 1974, it treated 4,476
clients on an outpatient basis and 355 resident clients. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
AND DEVELOPMENTAl. DISABILITIES, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1974).
19. Statistics on the incidence of criminal activity by residents of half-way houses foi
former prisoners are not well developed. In Illinois, there have been "no more than four"
felonies committed by offenders participating in the work-release program. During 1975,
only 3'% of the offenders in the work-release program were returned to prison for violation
of program rules such as consumption of alcohol, unauthorized contact with women, and
late return to residential facilities. Williams Interview II, supra note 10. See also Chicago
Tribune, July 30, 1975, §3, at 2, col. 1.
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and individuals attempt to exclude rehabilitation facilities'" and will
detail the possible defenses to such actions. The work is divided into
three main sections. The section on "Zoning and Home Rule Issues" will
discuss the compatibility of rehabilitation facilities with residential
areas and will urge balancing state policy and regional interests against
attempts to exclude such facilities. Balancing competing interests
through carefully shaped remedies is also the focus of the section on
"Nuisance Issues." The section on "Constitutional Issues" will consider
possible constitutional rights of persons who are excluded from com-
munity facilities. These rights include federal and state equal protec-
tion, the right to travel, and the due process prohibition against irrebut-
able presumptions.
I. ZONING AND HOME RULE ISSUES
Prior to implementation of home rule by the 1970 Illinois Constitu-
tion, all Illinois municipalities derived their zoning power from state
statute." Adoption of home rule gave home rule units a new source of
zoning power. Although the scope of this power has not been deline-
ated,23 it is clear that home rule is not a license for unconstitutional or
unreasonable actions by municipalities. Basic constitutional limitations
on zoning power apply regardless of the source of power.
'20. There is no generic term which adequately encompasses facilities for all the classes
of individuals this Comment will discuss. For the sake of convenience, when referring to
all types of facilities this Comment will use "rehabilitation facility," although in a strict
sense some facilities, such as a shelter home for retardates, might not engage in rehabilita-
tion.
21. "To the end that ... the public health, safety, comfort, morals and welfare may
otherwise be promoted, . . . the corporate authorities in each municipality have the
following [zoning] powers. ... ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-1 (1975).
22. See note 58 and accompanying text infra.
23. To date there have been no cases demarcating the scope of a home rule unit's zoning
power. However, the broad scope of statutory zoning power indicates that home rule has
not expanded it.
24. Arbitrary and unreasonable zoning has been held to violate constitutional protec-
tions of due process and equal protection. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Wil-
mette, 27 Il.2d 116, 126, 188 N.E.2d 33, 37-38 (1963) (voiding as unreasonable an ordi-
nance which restricted an area to residential use when the surrounding land was zoned
for commercial use); Atkins v. County of Cook, 18 Ill.2d 287, 293, 297, 163 N.E.2d 826,
830, 832 (1960) (voiding as unreasonable an ordinance which would not allow construction
of a gas station on farm land near a busy intersection and a developing business district);
Western Theological Seminary v. City of Evanston, 325 11. 511, 524-25, 156 N.E. 778, 783-
84 (1927) (enjoining enforcement of an amended zoning ordinance as unreasonable when
a seminary purchased land for establishment of a college relying on the original ordinance
which allowed such a use).
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When a zoning ordinance impinges on a fundamental right or creates
a suspect classification, the burden of showing the validity of the ordi-
nance is placed upon the municipality, and the municipality must show
a compelling governmental interest in order to uphold the classifica-
tion.25 In the vast majority of cases, however, the judiciary has given
deference to local zoning decisions. Zoning ordinances are presumed
valid and will be upheld unless the persons challenging them establish
their invalidity by clear and convincing evidence that the ordinances are
arbitrary and unreasonable. " The general standard for reasonableness
is that zoning must bear "a substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, comfort, morals, and welfare.," 7 Although each case must be
decided on its own facts, the Illinois Supreme Court has given six factors
which should be considered in determining whether a zoning ordinance
is reasonable. " For the purposes of this Comment, the most important
of these factors is that the proposed land use should be compatible with
the existing uses of nearby property. Two other limitations on zoning
25. See Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 911 (1970), aff'd, 487
F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974). See also Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 415 (7th Cir. 1975);
Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 181,
336 A.2d 713, 730 (1975).
26. Behnke v. President and Bd. of Trustees, 366 Ill. 516, 518-19, 9 N.E,2d 232, 233
(1937). See Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 Ill.2d 107, 110, 324 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1975)
(finding unreasonable a county's agreement with developer that no more than 25% of his
sites be leased to families with children); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 25 Ill.2d
434, 441, 185 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1962) (upholding as reasonable a zoning ordinance which
prohibited multi-family units in the middle of a single-family area). See also Kratovil &
Ziegweid, Illinois Municipal Home Rule and Urban Land-A Test Run of The New
Constitution, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 380-83 (1972), and the grandparent of zoning cases,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
27. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 24 Ill.2d 497, 501, 182 N.E.2d 147, 150
(1962). The quoted language parallels art. VII, §6(a) which gives home rule units "the
power to regulate for the public health, safety, morals, and welfare .... ." See also
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Western Theological Seminary v.
City of Evanston, 325 I1. 511, 523, 156 N.E. 778, 783 (1927); 8 E. McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPS. §25.17 (3d ed. 1965).
28. The factors are: (1) existing uses of nearby property; (2) suitability of property for
zoned (or proposed) use; (3) extent to which destruction of property values of the site
promotes the general welfare; (4) gain to the public compared to hardship imposed on
property owners; (5) reduction in property value resulting from zoning restriction; (6)
length of time the property has been vacant, as zoned, considered in the context of land
development in the area where the property is located. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. County
of Cook, 25 1ll.2d 434, 440, 185 N.E.2d 250, 253 (1962), citing LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County
of Cook, 12 Ill.2d 40, 46-47, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1957). See also LaSalle Nat'l Bank v.
Village of Harwood Heights, 2 Ill.App.3d 1040, 1045-46, 278 N.E.2d 114, 117-18 (1st Dist.
1971).
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power, overriding state interests and regional needs, will also be dis-
cussed.
A. Compatibility With Existing Uses
When a rehabilitation facility is excluded through zoning,"0 the par-
ties who seek to operate the facility will argue that the exclusion is
unreasonable. In the event that the municipality has made no ordinance
provision for rehabilitation facilities, a court might mechanically com-
pare the proposed use with definitions of land uses which are permitted
under the existing zoning ordinances.' Preferably, courts will examine
the factors considered in determining an ordinance's reasonableness, 31
particularly the suitability of the property in question for the proposed
use 2 and the uses and zoning of nearby property.33
Generally, courts have held that rehabilitation facilities are com-
patible with residential and business zoning, but courts make an im-
portant distinction between residential areas zoned for single-family
use and areas zoned for apartment use. If the relationship among the
facility residents is very similar to that of a traditional family, the
facility usually will be allowed in a single-family area; if the facility is
more institutional in character, it is often restricted to apartment or
business areas.3 For example, the decision concerning a facility for
29. There are three ways in which a municipality might exclude rehabilitation facilities
through zoning: (1) explicit prohibition of rehabilitation facilities; (2) allowance of reha-
bilitation facilities through special use permits with refusal to issue such permits; and (3)
failure to provide for rehabilitation facilities, neither permitting nor prohibiting them.
Since the increase in number of community rehabilitation facilities is a recent occurrence,
most municipalities have made no provision for rehabilitation facilities.
30. For example, in Arkansas Release Guidance Foundation v. Hummel, 245 Ark. 953,
435 S.W.2d 774 (1969), the court prohibited the opening of a half-way house for parolees
because it did not meet the definition of a philanthropic institution, which was one of the
permitted uses. The court did not discuss whether the use was compatible with existing
uses or in keeping with public policy. It treated the issue as one for resolution by diction-
ary.
31. See, e.g., High Meadows Park, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 112 Ill.App.2d 220, 231-33,
250 N.E.2d 517, 523-24 (2d Dist. 1969). See also note 28 supra.
:32. See, e.g., Langguth v. Village of Mount Prospect, 5 1ll.2d 49, 54, 124 N.E.2d 879,
881 (1955); Petropoulos v. City of Chicago, 5 Ill.2d 270, 274, 125 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1955).
33. When considering nearby property, courts may pay more attention to the actual use
of the nearby property than its zoning classification. In Eckhardt v. City of Des Plaines,
13 Ill.2d 562, 150 N.E.2d 621 (1958), the court refused to allow the plaintiff to operate a
nursing home in an area zoned for apartments and hotels because, despite the zoning, the
dominant use was single-family homes.
34. See Hazel Wilson Hotel Corp. v. City of Chicago, 17 Ill.App.3d 415, 308 N.E.2d 372
(1st Dist. 1974), in which a shelter home for former mental patients was declared permissi-
ble in a business district which already allowed apartment hotels and boarding houses.
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dependent35 or delinquent children may turn on the home's similarity
to a nuclear family. A group consisting of a married couple, their two
children, and ten foster children fit the definition of family for the pur-
pose of a zoning ordinance and thus could occupy a home in a single-
family district.36 On the other hand, a commercially operated group
home for delinquent and dependent children in which "parents" worked
in shifts with other home personnel might not fall within the definition
of "family" for the purposes of zoning. 7
While the residents of a rehabilitation facility may have greater emo-
tional, social, or medical problems than most persons in a residential
neighborhood, the facility should be deemed compatible as long as it
does not radically alter the general character of the area. In balancing
the needs of the neighborhood with those of facility residents, the courts
seem to recognize that a community must tolerate some departures from
the norm.
B. Overriding State Interest
In considering the validity of a zoning ordinance which excludes a
rehabilitation facility, courts should be cognizant of questions that tran-
scend the local community boundary. These considerations are state
The home opened in Chicago in 1967, approved by the state but without license from the
city. At the time it opened, city zoning laws made no provision for shelter homes in
business districts. In 1970, the city made shelter homes a special use in residential districts
but refused to issue a permit to the home. The court compelled issuance of the permit.
See also Ganim v. Village of New York Mills, 75 Misc.2d 653, 347 N.Y.S.2d 372 (Sup. Ct.
1973) (family care homes for former mental patients compatible with boarding house
district); Beckman v. City of Grand Island, 182 Neb. 840, 157 N.W.2d 769 (1968) (treat-
ment house for alcoholics compatible with boarding house district).
35. Dependent children are minors who have been neglected or abandoned by their
parents and are wards of the state.
36. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449
(1974). The court noted the holding in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974),
that a municipality could zone to protect "family values" and "youth values" and said,
"The group home does not conflict with that character, and, indeed, is deliberately de-
signed to conform with it." 34 N.Y.2d at 305, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
37. Browndale Int'l Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis.2d 182, 208 N.W.2d 121 (1973).
Schools for emotionally disturbed or delinquent children also present a compatibility
issue. Some towns have attempted to exclude such schools from residential areas while
permitting public schools in the same area. Courts have held that schools for disturbed
or delinquent children fall within the definition of "school" and must be permitted. See
Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196 (Utah 1974); Armstrong v. Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 158,
257 A.2d 799 (1969); Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. Hill, 11 N.Y.2d 182, 182 N.E.2d
268, 227 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1962). Cf. Village of University Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Or-
phans' Home, 20 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 569 (1927).
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policy, expressed by the state's constitution and statutes," and regional
interests.5
New York has been a leader in weighing state policy against attempts
to exclude rehabilitation centers through zoning. For example, one court
struck down an ordinance which attempted to prohibit the use of a home
in a single-family area for the care of neglected and abandoned children,
declaring, "It is clear that this zoning ordinance has the effect of totally
thwarting the state's policy as expressed in its constitution and Social
Service Law, of providing for neglected children." 4" New York courts
also have invalidated ordinances which attempted to block facilities for
former mental patients4 and narcotic addicts," holding that the spirit
of state statutes prohibited such exclusions.
While the Illinois courts have not widely used state statutes to invali-
date zoning ordinances, there is at least one decision which establishes
the precedent for doing so. In Duggan v. County of Cook,43 the Illinois
Supreme Court voided a provision in a special use permit which re-
quired that the developer of a mobile home park not lease more than 25
per cent of his sites to families with children. The provision conflicted
with a statute which prohibits the leasing of property on the condition
that the lessee have no children under the age of 14." With little discus-
38. In addition to state policy regarding community rehabilitation centers, there are
also several U.S. statutes which fund community treatment programs for various classes
of individuals. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2683(2) (mentally ill), §2688e (developmentally disa-
bled), §3750 (criminal offenders), §3843 (juvenile delinquents), §2688k (drug offenders),
and §2688e (alcoholics).
39. While there are barriers to an ordinary statute limiting home rule powers, there are
no such barriers to a statute limiting the power of non-home rule units. See the discussion
of the "clean slate doctrine," note 58 and accompanying text infra.
40. Abbott House v. Village of Tarrytown, 34 App.Div.2d 821, 822, 312 N.Y.S.2d 841,
843 (2d Dept. 1970) (village alleged home would violate ordinance which defined "family"
in terms of marriage, blood, and adoption). Cf. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.
2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974); Nowack v. Department of Audit &
Control, 72 Misc.2d 518, 338 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Jewish Consumptives' Relief
Soc'y v. Town of Woodbury, 230 App.Div. 228, 243 N.Y.S. 686 (1930), aff'd, 256 N.Y. 619,
117 N.E.2d 165 (1931).
41. See Ganim v. Village of New York Mills, 75 Misc.2d 653, 347 N.Y.S.2d 372 (Sup.
Ct. 1973).
42. Hepper v. Town of Hillsdale, 63 Misc.2d 447, 311 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. 1970). The
court cited N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §200(1), (3) (McKinney 1970) which declared there
was an imperative need for drug treatment homes. The court said, "The purpose of the
ordinance is obviously inconsistent with the organic law of the state, and therefore, is
unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive to a valid state purpose." 63 Misc.2d at 451, 311
N.Y.S.2d at 743.
43. 60 1ll.2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406 (1975).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, §37 (1975):
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sion, the court concluded, "We agree that the condition. violates the
public policy of this state." 5
If Illinois courts choose to follow the Duggan approach and invalidate
zoning restrictions against rehabilitation facilities on the basis of state
policy, there are numerous statutes from which to work. The Equal
Opportunities for the Handicapped Act'" provides: "It is the policy of
this State . . .to guarantee physically and mentally handicapped per-
sons the fullest possible . . [right] to secure housing accommodations
of their choice. . .. "' The mental health laws call for persons dis-
charged from state institutions to be placed in facilities "in or near the
community in which the person resided prior to hospitalization."" The
Illinois Dangerous Drug Abuse Act'" contains language very similar to a
New York statute which already has been used to strike down an ordi-
nance prohibiting the establishment of drug abuse treatment centers. 0
It shall hereinafter be deemed unlawful and opposed to public policy . . .to
require as a condition precedent to the leasing of any dwelling . . .[that the
lessee have] no children under the age of 14 years residing in their families
45. 60 Ill.2d at 116, 324 N.E.2d at 411. The decision in Duggan was against a home rule
unit, but it nonetheless shows the court's willingness to use statutory policy to strike down
a zoning ordinance. In the case of non-home rule units, the argument for using statutory
policy is even stronger, since non-home rule units do not have the protection of the "clean
slate doctrine" which home rule units have. The doctrine was established in order to
promote the goal of giving home rule units added autonomy and flexibility in dealing with
their own problems. It holds that statutes passed prior to the 1970 constitution do not limit
home rule powers. Duggan was inconsistent -with the "clean slate doctrine" in that it
allowed a pre-1970 statute to limit a home rule unit's powers. For more on the "clean slate
doctrine," see note 58 infra.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§65-21 et seq. (1975).
47. Id. §65-21.
48. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 911/2, §100-15 (1975). See also id. §§50-21, 52, 100.34, 300.1 et
seq. For the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities' policy
favoring community facilities, see DMH, MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 14; DMH PLAN,
supra note 8, at 11-2.
49. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 911/2, §§120.1 et seq. (1975).
It is the public policy of this state that the human suffering and social and
economic loss caused by addiction to controlled substances and the use of can-
nabis are matters of grave concern to the people of the state. It is imperative
that a comprehensive program be established and implemented through the
facilities of the State, counties, municipalities, the Federal Government, and
local and private agencies . . . to provide diagnosis, treatment, care and reha-
bilitation for controlled substance addicts to the end that these unfortunate
individuals may be restored to good health and again become useful citizens in
the community.
Id. §120.2. The Act allows the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabili-
ties to fund public and private drug abuse programs.
50. See note 42 supra.
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Statutes also provide for facilities for alcoholics, 5' ex-convicts,52 and de-
linquent and dependent children.5" These statutes, however, do not spe-
cifically prohibit zoning restrictions against the facilities. 54 Therefore, if
Illinois courts were to invalidate ordinances banning rehabilitation facil-
ities on the basis of statutory policy, they would have to do so through
commitment to the spirit, and not just the letter, of the policy. New
York took precisely that step.55 It is a desirable approach, since it gives
effect to state policy that otherwise might be consistently thwarted by
parochial interests."
C. Regional Interests and Home Rule Issues
In Illinois, the mere existence of a statute favoring community
rehabilitation facilities will not be enough to overcome a restrictive
zoning ordinance passed by a home rule unit. 7 The reason for this is the
"clean slate doctrine"'5, which holds that if a subject of legislation is
51. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91V/2, § 100-10 (1975) gives the Department of Mental Health
the power to establish its own alcoholic treatment centers or contract with private institu-
tions for their establishment.
52. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §1003-14-4 (1975) allows the Department of Corrections to
establish half-way homes for persons on parole or mandatory release.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§5001 et seq. (1975) allows the Department of Children and
Family Services to fund public and private facilities for delinquent, dependent and handi-
capped children.
54. California, foreseeing obstacles to the development of community facilities for the
handicapped, passed a statute specifically prohibiting restrictions against facilities for the
handicapped. The statute declares, "It is the policy of this state ... that mentally and
physically handicapped persons are entitled to live in normal residential surroundings and
should not be excluded therefrom because of their disability." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§5115(a) (West. 1972). The Act and a later amendment provide that use of property for
the care of six or fewer handicapped persons shall be considered a residential use for the
purposes of zoning, including single-family districts. Id. §§5515(b), 5116 (West Supp.
1975). But cf. Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal.App.3d 46, 100 Cal.Rptr. 779 (1972) (a restrictive
covenant successfully blocked housing of retarded persons in a residential area).
55. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
56. A conservative judicial view might be that if the legislature meant to override local
zoning laws, it would have so provided.
57. Home rule units include any county which has a chief executive officer elected by
the electors of the county and any municipality which has a population of more than
25,000. Municipalities with a population less than 25,000 may elect to become home rule
units. ILL. CONST. art. VII, §6(a). Currently, there are 86 home rule units in Illinois.
INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, HOME RULE HANDBOOK FOR ILLINOIS LOCAL
OFFICIALS 79 (1975).
58. The case which introduced the "clean slate doctrine," Kanellos v. County of Cook,
53 ll.2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972), held that Cook County, a home rule unit, could issue
obligation bonds without meeting the referendum requirement of a pre-1970 statute. It
was reasoned that the goal of local autonomy would be thwarted if legislation passed
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found to be a home rule power, the power should not be limited by
statutes which were passed prior to the new constitution. Nonetheless,
control of rehabilitation facilities should not be exclusively a home rule
power, since the state and region have a substantial interest in the
existence of such facilities.
The framers of the constitution gave little guidance in setting criteria
for what is and is not a home rule power.5" The constitution itself allows
home rule units to "exercise any power and perform any function per-
taining to its government and affairs ... "60 To limit this power, a
court would have to find that an issue of overriding state or regional
interest does not pertain to a home rule unit's government and affairs
and, therefore, is not a home rule power. Alternatively, a court might
find that a subject is a home rule power, but the exercise of power must
be limited so that it does not interfere with overriding state or regional
interests.
In order to give guidance in determining what is a home rule power,
Professor Terrance Sandalow, a leading writer on home rule, has sug-
gested three factors for consideration: (1) interference with state regula-
tion; (2) extra-territorial impact"' of local legislation; and (3) existence
of basic community values which are better protected by the state gov-
ernment.2 These factors should be utilized along with consideration of
before home rule was conceived could serve to limit home rule. In order to limit home rule
powers by statute, the legislature must specifically declare its intent to do so. ILL. CONST.
art. VII, §§(g)-(i). If the power being limited is not going to be exercised by the state, then
the limitation must be passed by three-fifths of the members of both houses. Id. at §6(g).
Prior to the new constitution, all Illinois municipalities derived their power from the
state. Illinois had adhered to Dillon's Rule, which holds that a municipality is a creature
of the state and may exercise only such power as the legislature grants or is necessarily
and fairly implied from the legislative grant. 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPS. §237(89) (5th
ed. 1911). For application of the principles of Dillon's Rule, see Ives v. City of Chicago,
30 Ill.2d 582, 198 N.E.2d 518 (1964).
59. The closest the Committee on Local Government came to setting criteria for what
is and is not a home rule power was a brief list of areas which are not proper subjects for
home rule powers. "Their powers should not extend to such areas as divorce, real property
law, trusts, contracts, etc., which are generally recognized as falling within the compe-
tence of the state rather than local authorities." SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1621 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
The Committee referred to judicial intervention regarding home rule as a "danger." Id.
at 1622. Nonetheless, the courts cannot escape the duty to determine the scope and limits
of home rule power.
60. ILL. CONsT. art. VII, §6(a).
61. Extraterritorial impact refers to the effect zoning will have on communities outside
the municipality which adopted the zoning ordinance.
62. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts,
48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 665-721 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sandalow]. Professor Vincent
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which level of government-state or local-has the better resources for
handling a particular problem. Related to these factors will be the needs
for uniformity and coordination of regulation."
Applying these criteria to home rule unit restrictions on rehabilitation
facilities, a strong argument can be made for limiting a home rule unit's
power to exclude rehabilitation facilities. First, exclusion of such facili-
ties interferes with state regulations which favor the return of former
mental patients and offenders to their communities. 4 Second, exclusion
of rehabilitation centers has substantial extra-territorial impact, espe-
cially if it is common practice to exclude such facilities. For example, if
facilities are totally excluded or confined to ghettos, the problems of the
persons who need the facilities and the resulting injury to society are
perpetuated. Persons who require the housing are less likely to be reinte-
grated into society, thus causing personal suffering for them as well as
a drain on society's resources. Third, the housing and treatment of so-
ciety's outcasts may relate to basic community values which are better
protected by the state than by local governments. And fourth, the state
has better resources than local governments to coordinate state-wide
regulation and placement of rehabilitation facilities. In summary, al-
though zoning in general may be a topic of local concern,65 it is not
appropriate for exclusive local control when the subject of the zoning
also is a matter of overriding regional and state interest. This is not to
say that local communities do not have an important interest in the
safety of their citizens and the preservation of the character of their
neighborhoods. Municipalities should be permitted to make reasonable
Vitullo of DePaul University holds a similar view and suggests that the courts should
determine whether an activity is better handled by local control, state control, or both
simultaneously. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers and
Limitations, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 137, 155 & n.63. See also 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORP.
LAW §3.21 (1975): "What is called for is an open discussion of whether the concern of the
people of the entire state is greater, in a particular instance, than the concern of the local
residents." Id. at 3-59.
63. The four sample areas of "competence of the state," see note 59 supra, fit the
criteria proposed by Sandalow and this Comment. Regulation of any of the subjects would
interfere with established state regulation and would have impact beyond the home rule
unit's boundary. The subject of divorce relates to basic community values and is better
regulated by the state than local government. The state also has better resources for
determining state-wide needs in areas such as contracts, trusts, and property. Uniformity
promotes smoother operation of government, business, and personal affairs.
64. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
65. See Johnny Bruce Co. v. City of Champaign, 24 Ill.App.3d 900, 321 N.E.2d 469 (4th
Dist. 1974), in which it was held that zoning is a home rule power. Bruce, however,
concerned a home rule unit's power to change its zoning procedure. There was no substan-
tial state or regional interest.
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regulations concerning the size and location of facilities and the persons
housed in them. 6
There is precedent for balancing regional needs against local interests
when considering exclusionary zoning ordinances, although the cases to
date have not dealt with home rule issues. Courts have held that zoning
must promote the general welfare, and that general welfare encompasses
the needs of an entire area-not just a single municipality. 7
In Illinois, the regional scope of general welfare for the purposes of
zoning is an open question. The supreme court has not defined "general
welfare" or "community," but it has stated that zoning must promote
the general welfare of the entire community rather than just a segment
of the population. However, the factual circumstances in the cases indi-
cate that the court used "community" to refer to the municipality."
Recently, an Illinois appellate court has given some weight to regional
needs. In Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will,"5 the court overturned
66. For example, a municipality should be able to prohibit the housing of persons who
are psychotic or likely to commit crimes. Municipalities also could require that rehabilita-
tion facilities be located in areas with which they would be compatible.
67. In Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 179, 336 A.2d 713, 727-28 (1975), the court struck down a zoning ordinance which
would have effectively blocked housing for low and moderate income families, declaring:
It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing for all
categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general
welfare in all local land use regulations. .. . [Tlhe general welfare which
developing communities like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their
boundaries and cannot be confined to the claimed good of a particular com-
munity.
The court said further that every municipality "must bear its fair share of the regional
burden." Id. at 189, 336 A.2d at 733. See also Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma,
375 F.Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
where the court recognized that the validity of an exclusionary zoning plan must be
considered in light of regional housing needs. See also National Land & Inv. Corp. v.
Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966).
The groundwork for considering regional needs was laid in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In addition to holding that if a zoning classification were
"fairly debatable," it would be upheld, the Supreme Court also said its ruling was not
meant "to exclude the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far
outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to
stand in the way." Id. at 388, 390.
Any community which argues that it should be able to exclude all rehabilitation facili-
ties should be required to show why, among all towns in the region, it should be set aside
from sharing the regional burden. Cf. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 1.49-50 (1966).
68. See Skrysak v. Village of Mount Prospect, 13 Ill.2d 329, 334, 148 N.E.2d 721, 723
(1958); Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 408 Ill. 91,102, 96 N.E.2d 499, 505 (1951); Michigan-
Lake Bldg. Corp. v. Hamilton, 340 Ill. 284, 298, 172 N.E.2d 710, 716 (1930).
69. 114 Ill.App.2d 267, 252 N.E.2d 765 (3d Dist. 1969).
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a county zoning ordinance which prohibited development of a mobile
home park in an area of worthless farmland. The court said, "While we
do not predicate our conclusion upon the need for lower cost housing,
we believe that this was an element which should be considered in
determining the reasonableness of the restrictive zoning ordinance."' "
Another home rule issue is raised when a rehabilitation facility is
being operated by the state or a political subdivision of the state. It has
been, asserted that home rule powers cannot be enforced against the
state and that "the existence of home rule power is irrelevant to issues
posed by attempted municipal regulation of other government agen-
cies."71 Two Illinois cases support this view. Both cases involved at-
tempts by a home unit to block construction of a sewage treatment plant
by a state-created sanitary district." In the first case, the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that the sanitary district's "power of eminent domain
was not subject to [the home rule unit's] zoning ordinance."" The
court did not explain its ruling further; nevertheless, it seemed that
operations of the state or districts created by the state are not subject
to local zoning.74 In the second case, the same city attempted to block
the sewage plant through a health ordinance. The supreme court found
that the ordinance, as applied, did not pertain to the home rule unit's
"government and affairs" within the meaning of article VII, section 6(a)
of the state constitution. The court said, "Our fundamental difficulty
is that to permit a regional district to be regulated by a part of that
region is incompatible with the purpose for which it was created."75 By
similar reasoning, Illinois courts might conclude that local governments
70. Id. at 279, 252 N.E.2d at 770. The court considered the need for low cost housing in
the surrounding region.
71. Sandalow, supra note 62, at 682 n.154.
72. City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 59 Ill.2d 29, 319 N.E.2d 9 (1974);
Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 I1l.2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716 (1976).
73. 59 1ll.2d at 30, 319 N.E.2d at 10.
74. An alternate view of City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 59 Ill.2d
29, 319 N.E.2d 9 (1974), is that the ordinance in question did not prevail because it was
not an exercise of home rule power. In order to be a valid exercise of home rule power,
under the alternate theory, the ordinance would have to be passed after the 1970 constitu-
tion, which created home rule power. In effect, this is an inverse of the "clean slate
doctrine," which holds that statutes passed prior to the constitution cannot limit a home
rule unit's powers. For more on the "clean slate doctrine," see text accompanying note 58
supra.
75. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 Ill.2d 256, 261, 347 N.E.2d
716, 719 (1976). It is interesting to note that in its unreported opinion, the supreme court
used different language: "Our fundamental difficulty is that it imposes environmental
regulation upon an essential function of a regional District in a manner that substantially
threatens the District's ability to perform." No. 47993 at 3 (Sup. Ct. Ill., March 29, 1976).
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may not block operation of state operated rehabilitation facilities. Mu-
nicipal prohibition of such facilities could be deemed incompatible with
the purposes of the state departments of mental health, corrections, and
children."
II. NuisANCE ISSUES
Second to zoning, nuisance litigation" is the major legal tool to pro-
hibit the operation of rehabilitation facilities. Either a governmental
unit or the neighbors of rehabilitation facilities can attempt to enjoin
operation of a facility. While there have been no reported cases in Illi-
nois in which a nuisance claim has been raised against a rehabilitation
center, the appellate court has held that a sheltered care home which
housed former mental patients is "not a use which was per se inimical
to the public health, safety, or welfare of the municipality."78
Those jurisdictions which have addressed the nuisance claim have
balanced the competing interests of community safety and the welfare
of individuals in need of community treatment facilities. In Nicholson
76. Following the court's reasoning in its original opinion, one could conclude that
rehabilitation facilities would be deemed an essential function of the state departments
of mental health, corrections, and children.
It is not clear whether the courts will hold that a home rule unit may not interfere with
any state operation or whether home rule units may block some operations, but not others.
If the court adopted a standard that a home rule unit may not interfere with "essential"
state operations, but can interfere with others, it might conlude that rehabilitation facili-
ties are not an essential function since alternatives are available, such as continued hospi-
talization or incarceration, out-patient care, and home care. Sewage plants, as in
Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, on the other hand, are essential since
a sanitary district has no practical alternatives to sewage plants. A good standard might
be a balancing test, weighing state needs against local interests. In applying this test, it
should be recognized that the state has demonstrated substantial interest in an area by
creating a specific agency to deal with it.
77. At common law, a nuisance is that which "unlawfully annoys or does damage to
another." Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 34 Ill.2d
544, 546, 216 N.E.2d 788, 790 (1966). It is "offensive, physically, to the senses and, by such
offensiveness, makes life uncomfortable." Bauman v. Piser Undertakers C o., 34 Ill.App.2d
145, 147, 180 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1st Dist. 1962); Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. City of Chicago,
352 11. 11, 30, 185 N.E. 170, 177 (1933). A nuisance can be relative to location; what is a
nuisance in one place might not be in another. Bauman v. Piser Undertakers Co., supra
at 147-48, 180 N.E.2d at 707. Injuries must be material and not speculative or fanciful.
Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, supra at 547, 216
N.E.2d at 790. In determining whether a nuisance exists, a common standard is "its effect
upon . ..a normal person of ordinary habits and sensibilities." Id. at 544, 216 N.E.2d at
791, quoting 39 AM. JUR. NUISANCES §31.
78. Hazel Wilson Hotel Corp. v. City of Chicago, 17 Ill.App.3d 415, 419, 308 N.E.2d 372,
376 (1st Dist. 1974). For further discussion of Hazel Wilson see note 34 supra.
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v. Connecticut Halfway House, Inc.," the Supreme Court of Connecti-
cut considered a nuisance claim raised against a proposed half-way
house for ex-convicts. Following the announcement of plans to open a
house for 15 men in an apartment district, local property owners sought
to enjoin the use on the grounds that it would threaten the peaceful use
and quiet enjoyment of their property. 0 The court denied relief, finding
the neighbors' fears were based "completely on supposition" and were
"speculative and intangible."'" The court also held, "The mere depre-
ciation of land values, caused . . . by . . . apprehensions . . . cannot
sustain injunction on the ground of nuisance." 2
Another example of balancing the need for community safety against
the need for rehabilitation centers is found in People v. HST Meth, Inc.83
There, the State of New York sought to close down a methadone mainte-
nance clinic located in a middle and upper income residential area. The
clinic had a case load of 500 patients, 200 more than the maximum
number recommended by the Health and Hospital Planning Council.
Although finding that the center's patients terrorized residents of the
neighborhood and that the street in front of the clinic was "a veritable
market place for narcotics," 4 the court chose not to enjoin the whole
operation but to enjoin "only those activities which . . . make it a
nuisance."" Consequently, the court ordered the clinic to reduce its case
load to the recommended maximum of 300 and directed it to exercise
greater supervision of clinic patients within and outside the facility.8
As in zoning cases, nuisance litigation will require the balancing of
competing interests. This function is well suited to equity courts where
nuisance claims are heard.
Il. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
When a municipality passes an ordinance excluding rehabilitation
facilities or the persons who would be housed in them, certain constitu-
tional issues arise. This section will examine the constitutional issues
79. 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d 383 (1966).
80. For statistics on crime by residents of half-way houses, see note 19 supra.
81. 153 Conn. at 511, 218 A.2d at 386.
82. Id. at 512, 218 A.2d at 386.
83. 74 Misc.2d 920, 346 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1973), aff'd, 43 App.Div.2d 932, 352 N.Y.S.2d
487 (1974).
84. Id. at 921, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
85. Id. at 922, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
86. The greater supervision included placement of uniformed guards instructed to dis-
perse groups of more than two people loitering on the street in the vicinity of the clinic.
Id. at 923, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
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primarily from the perspective of residents of rehabilitation facilities.
The issues include federal and state equal protection, the due process
right to travel, and the due process prohibition against irrebutable pre-
sumptions."7
A. Equal Protection
If the courts were to subject an ordinance regarding rehabilitation
facilities to strict scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause, it first would have to be shown that the ordinance affects
a fundamental right or is based on a suspect classification. While the
Burger Court has been reluctant "to create [new] substantive constitu-
tional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws," '
it has continued to recognize traditional suspect classifications. 9 In de-
termining the existence of a suspect classification, the Burger Court has
recognized three indicia: (1) "immutable characteristic[ s] determined
solely by the accident of birth;"99 (2) "history of purposeful unequal
treatment" and disabilities;9 and (3) "position of political powerless-
ness." Of the three indicia, the Court seems to favor the first because
it is relatively easy to define and apply.9
Applying these indicia to ex-convicts, drug offenders, alcoholics, and
juvenile delinquents, it is unlikely that a classification regarding any of
the groups would be found to be suspect. Research has not shown that
the characteristics of such classes are immutable from birth; further-
more, the unequal treatment and political powerlessness of these groups
might be considered justified. However, classifications concerning de-
velopmentally disabled persons 4 may be another matter. Most retarded
87. Another due process issue-the right of an owner of a facility to be free from arbi-
trary and unreasonable zoning-has been discussed in text accompanying notes 26-27
supra.
88. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). See also Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (concurring opinion); Gunther, Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HAHV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972).
89. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The traditional suspect classifica-
tions are race, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), nationality, e.g., Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and alienage, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, supra.
90. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
91. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
92. Id.
93. If the second and third indicia were to create a suspect classification in and of
themselves, the unequal treatment and powerlessness probably would have to be unjusti-
fied and extreme.
94. The developmentally disabled include retarded persons and those with cerebral
palsy and epilepsy. DMH, MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 4, at 63 n.ll.
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individuals indeed possess a characteristic immutable from birth and
also face unequal treatment due to their positions of powerlessness.
Consequently, a classification which seeks to exclude developmentally
disabled persons from community facilities arguably could be suspect
under federal equal protection standards.
On the other hand, classifications concerning the mentally ill present
a different problem. Under modem theory, most mental illness is con-
sidered transient-a condition which will disappear after it "serves its
purpose."9 5 Thus, the characteristic is not immutable and probably not
subject to federal strict scrutiny."
Regardless of the federal standard, it is likely the Illinois courts would
find classifications based solely upon mental handicap to be inherently
suspect. The state's interpretation of equal protection derives not only
from the United States Constitution and federal cases, but also from the
Illinois Constitution of 1970.
Article I, section 19 of the Illinois Constitution provides:
All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall be free from dis-
crimination in the sale or rental 7 of property and shall be free from
discrimination unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion prac-
tices of any employer.
At the time of its adoption, section 19, which applies to both governmen-
tal and private action, had no parallel in any other state constitution."
Like section 18 which prohibits sex discrimination," section 19 has no
committee report explaining its intended purpose, since it was first
offered on the floor of the convention without formal committee recom-
mendation. '"
95. Under the theory, most mental illness is considered an adaption to emotional stress.
Many symptoms of mental illness are regarded as emergency devices which will cease
when the need for them ceases. Illness will dissipate more rapidly when skillfully under-
stood and dealt with. K. MENNINGER, THE VITAL BALANCE 2, 173, 415 (1963).
96. But see Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
97. " '[Riental' is meant to include leaseholds and all other arrangements by which
possession or use of property is exchanged for a valuable consideration." Report of Bill of
Rights Committee, 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 59, at 70. Thus, the definition of rental
would include "rentals" by residents of private shelter care homes for the mentally disa-
bled, whose room and board are paid by the residents themselves, their families, or the
state.
98. Weisberg, Article I-Bill of Rights, 52 CHI. B. REc. 63, 65 (1970).
99. "The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex
by the State or its units of local government and school districts."
100. Although §19 was not introduced by the Bill of Rights Committee, the committee
did consider language which would prohibit discrimination against the handicapped. The
committee concluded, however, "that this was an appropriate subject for legislative action
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In People v. Ellis,'" the Illinois Supreme Court used section 18 to hold
that sex is a suspect classification, even though the federal Constitution
might not require the same finding."'2 Similarly, the court should utilize
section 19 to declare classifications based on mental and physical
handicaps to be prohibited or suspect, at least insofar as they relate to
housing and employment.' 3 If the court did this, it would be creating a
new form of suspect classification-one based on limited purpose. Un-
like traditional suspect classifications, such as race and nationality, a
rather than constitutional provision." 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 59, at 70. Thus, there is
no committee report explaining the section. The proposal for a provision prohibiting
discrimination against the handicapped was introduced on the floor by delegates Daley,
Madigan, and Rachunas. 4 PROCEEDINGS at 3653.
By voice vote, the convention defeated a motion to add self-executing language to §19.
5 PROCEEDINGS at 3686. The self-executing clause was "These rights are in full without
action by the General Assembly." Id. at 3678. The effect of not including self-executing
language is not completely certain. In debate on the section, Delegate Parkhurst said that
without a self-executing clause, the section would be a mere "expression of public policy"
without a remedy. Id. at 3684. Delegate Weisberg disagreed, saying, the section "is not a
hortatory statement. It creates rights." Id. at 3685. The convention did not officially
resolve the issue. It only voted to include the clause.
Nonetheless, there is ample reason to believe the section would be self-executing even
without the clause. Section 18 was held to be self-executing without such language. People
v. Ellis, 57 1ll.2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974). Ellis is discussed in text accompanying notes
101-102 infra. The only provision in the Bill of Rights which contains. a self-executing
clause is §17 which prohibits discrimination in employment and the sale or rental of
property. Yet, it has not been asserted that other provisions of the Bill of Rights need
special language in order to be self-executing. See, e.g., rights of due process, §2; religious
freedom, §3; speech, §4; assembly, §5; and trial by jury, §13. Further, the self-executing
nature of the Bill of Rights is strengthened by art. I, §12, which provides: "Every person
shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs .... "
In order to effectuate the language of §19, the General Assembly passed the Equal
Opportunities for the Handicapped Act, which inter alia establishes "the right to the
purchase or rental of property without discrimination because of physical or mental handi-
cap." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §65-21 (1975).
101. 57 Ill.2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
102. After referring to §18, the court said, "[Iln view of its explicit language and the
debates, we find inescapable the conclusion that it was intended to supplement and
expand the guaranties of the equal protection provision of the Bill of Rights .... " Id.
at 132, 311 N.E.2d at 101. Like §18, §19 contains explicit language prohibiting discrimina-
tion. However, unlike §18, §19 does not have constitutional debates which emphasize its
intent. Nonetheless, §19 clearly prohibits discrimination in housing and employment
against the handicapped.
103. Suspect classifications related to housing would be relatively easy to determine,
since §19 applies to all discrimination in housing. Suspect classifications related to em-
ployment, however, would be more complicated since the court would have to determine
if the classifications were "unrelated to ability." Courts also would have to create defini-
tions of "handicap," deciding, for example, what degree of mental retardation, visual
impairment, respiratory problem, or loss of use of limbs constitutes a handicap under §19.
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suspect classification based on mental handicap would not apply with
equal force to any area in which a differentiation is made on the basis
of the classification. For example, discrimination against the handi-
capped in education might not require strict scrutiny, although the
court could extend the spirit of section 19 to this area.
In City of Evanston v. Ridgeview House, Inc. ,1o the Illinois Supreme
Court briefly considered constitutional issues involving classifications
based on mental handicap. In Ridgeview, the city attempted to close
down a shelter care home for former mental patients, claiming the home
violated a condition in a special use permit which prohibited Ridgeview
from housing "persons suffering from mental retardation or mental dis-
orders apt to make them a burden to the other residents or to the
surrounding neighborhood. '" 1 0 5
The city had argued that the provision should be interpreted to mean
that all individuals suffering from mental retardation or mental illness
could not live at the home.10" The supreme court said that if it accepted
the city's interpretation of the ordinance, it "would entertain doubts
regarding [the ordinance's] constitutionality."'0 7 The court thus indi-
cated that a blanket classification excluding the handicapped would be
unconstitutional.
However, the court construed the ordinance in a manner consistent
with its apparent meaning, saying that the ordinance did not exclude
all persons with mental handicaps, rather it excluded only "those who
were apt to be a burden."''0 Under this construction, the court termed
the ordinance a "reasonable accommodation of the interests of all par-
ties, concerned."''0 The court said the shelter care home did not sustain
the burden of demonstrating that the ordinance is "arbitrary, unreason-
able, and lacking substantial relation to the public health, safety or
welfare.""' 0 Thus, the court did not apply a strict scrutiny-compelling
interest test, even though a classification based on mental handicap was
involved. Here, however, the classification was not based solely on men-
tal handicap, but rather on handicap plus a tendency to become a
burden. Had the classification been based solely on handicap, as the city
had urged, the court indicated the classification would have been uncon-
104. 64 Il1.2d 40, 349 N.E.2d 399 (1976).
105. Evanston, Ill., Ordinance 60-0-070, September, 1970.
106. City of Evanston v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 64 I11.2d 40, 58, 349 N.E.2d 399, 408
(1976).
107. Id. at 66, 349 N.E.2d at 412.
108. Id. at 58, 66, 349 N.E.2d at 408, 412.
109. Id. at 66, 349 N.E.2d at 412.
110. Id.
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stitutional. The court did not indicate, however, whether it would have
been unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny test or a rationality test."'
In light of constitutional history and Ellis, the court should declare
classifications based solely on handicap to be suspect and apply strict
scrutiny.
Applying a strict scrutiny test, a municipality obviously would have
a compelling interest in keeping psychotic and dangerous people off its
streets. But there would be no compelling interest in excluding moder-
ately disoriented, retarded persons who pose no danger to themselves or
others. The strict scrutiny requirement that the government use the
least burdensome alternative available will challenge mental health
workers and the courts to devise standards and screening systems which
will protect the rights of the mentally handicapped while protecting the
community."2
B. The Due Process Right to Travel
Supreme Court cases protecting the right to travel have involved regu-
lations which operated to withhold a benefit from persons who had
111. The supreme court also did not indicate under which provision such a classification
would be unconstitutional. The trial court had found the ordinance contrary to state and
federal provisions guaranteeing due process and equal protection, as well as art. I, §19 of
the Illinois Constitution which prohibits discrimination against persons with physical
or mental handicaps. In addition, the trial court found the ordinance void for vagueness.
City of Evanston v. Ridgeview House, Inc., No. 73 CH6013 (Cir. Ct., Cook Cty., Ill.,
November 19, 1974). The supreme court reversed the trial court's finding that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional and void for vagueness. Regarding vagueness, the supreme
court said the ordinance "affords sufficient warning so as to guide those to whom it
applies." 64 Ill.2d at 67, 349 N.E.2d at 412. Nonetheless, the supreme court affirmed the
trial court's finding that the city failed to prove a prima facie case. Thus, the home may
remain open.
112. If the court does not declare mental handicap to be a suspect classification and
applies only the traditional minimal scrutiny analysis, it might sustain an exclusionary
zoning ordinance if it finds a "reasonable basis" for distinguishing the class. Hoskins v.
Walker, 57 Ill.2d 503, 508, 315 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1974) (upholding a statute which disqualified
all persons associated with any school system from eligibility for appointment to the state
board of education). Cf. Latham v. Board of Educ., 31 Ill.2d 178, 185, 201 N.E.2d 111,
115-16 (1964) (upholding a statute which allowed Chicago's school board to be appointed
while boards for school districts of lesser size were elected, since there was "a real and
substantial difference" for distinguishing the classifications).
If the court applied the traditional analysis, ordinances could be drawn with less
precision-perhaps excluding all former mental patients because a few might be danger-
ous. Alternatively, under an intermediate standard which applies more than "minimal
scrutiny" but less than "compelling interest," a court could find that classifications which
exclude the handicapped are unreasonable or are not based on a substantial difference.
Cf. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, I.,
dissenting).
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recently moved from one place to another, while conferring the benefit
on long-time residents." 3 Although exclusion of rehabilitation facilities
does not penalize persons on the basis of travel per se, this Comment
will argue that exclusion on the basis of illness, handicap, or a criminal
record deprives individuals of the right to live in the community of their
choice-a right which should be encompassed by the constitutional
right to travel.
In order to find that exclusion of rehabilitation facilities impinges on
the right to travel, courts would have to expand the right in two respects.
First, it would have to be established that there is a right of intrastate
travel, since most residents of rehabilitation facilities travel from a state
institution to a community facility within the same state. Second, it
must be shown that the scope of the right to travel includes a right not
to be excluded from rehabilitation facilities and that, correlatively, com-
munities do not have the right to exclude such facilities for people who
want them. This proposed application of the right to travel does not go
so far as to say that persons have a right to live in a particular rehabilita-
tion facility or that such facilities must exist. As this Comment will
demonstrate, expansion of the right to travel to include intrastate travel
is consistent with existing notions of due process. Expansion of the scope
of the right to travel to encompass a right not to be excluded from a
rehabilitation facility may be more difficult. It involves a departure
from the traditional concept of the right to travel, and the Court has
shown a reluctance to expand existing constitutional rights."4
The right to travel interstate has been recognized repeatedly as a
"fundamental"" 5 or "basic constitutional freedom."", While the United
States Supreme Court has never specifically ruled on the right to travel
intrastate,"7 it has been implied in dicta"' and dealt with by the lower
113. See cases cited in notes 130-36 infra.
114. Cf. note 88 and accompanying text supra.
11.5. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). In addition to travel, voting and
equal access to appellate review in criminal cases have been recognized as fundamental
interests. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (access to appellate review).
116. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974). Cf. Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
117. In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the Court said, "Even
were we to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel, a
question we do not now consider . . . ." Id. at 255-56. Nonetheless, the Court's ruling
protected those who had moved intrastate as well as interstate. Id. at 270 (separate
opinion of Douglas, J.).
118. "Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as
well, was a part of our heritage. . . .Freedom of movement is basic to our scheme of
values." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958). "[Tihe right to travel intrastate is as
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courts. The Second Circuit, for example, in King v. New Rochelle Mu-
nicipal Housing Authority,"" declared a right of intrastate travel, say-
ing, "It would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between
states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowl-
edge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state."' 2" Prior
to United States v. Guest, 2' five sources of the right to travel interstate
had been suggested: the commerce clause,'22 article IV, section 2 privi-
leges and immunities, 2 ' fourteenth amendment privileges and immuni-
ties,'24 national citizenship, 125 and fifth amendment due process.' 2' Al-
though it has not been necessary to pinpoint a specific source of the right
of interstate travel,"' it may be necessary to identify the source of the
right of intrastate travel. If the right to travel were based exclusively on
the commerce clause, privilege and immunities clauses, or national
citizenship, a right to intrastate travel would be somewhat doubtful
since these clauses are concerned primarily with national rights and
interstate movement. If, on the other hand, the right to travel were
based on due process fundamental rights embodied in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, the rationale for a right to travel interstate
would apply with equal force to intrastate travel.
Assuming there is a right of intrastate travel based on due process,
the next issue to be dealt with is the scope of that right. The right to
travel clearly provides protection from interference while in transit 2 '
basic [as the right to travel interstatel." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255 (1964)
(separate opinion of Douglas, J.); Note, Residence Requirements after Shapiro v.
Thompson, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 134, 137-39 (1970).
119. 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir, 1971).
120. Id. at 648. In addition, the First Circuit may have impliedly found a right of
intrastate travel. In Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970), the court
struck down a Newport, Rhode Island housing authority regulation that denied public
housing to persons who had not been Newport residents for at least two years. The court
did not discuss a possible right of intrastate travel, but one of the plaintiffs, Catherine
Cole, was a resident of Jamestown, Rhode Island before she moved to Newport. Cole v.
Housing Authority, 312 F. Supp. 692, 694 (D.R.I. 1970).
121. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). The Court in Guest, a landmark travel case, concluded that
there was no need to isolate the source of the right to travel.
122. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 176 (1941).
123. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
124. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96 (1908).
125. See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867).
126. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964), quoting Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958).
127. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966). For a discussion of the develop-
ment of the right to travel, see Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, at 161-213 (1956).
128. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), held that blacks were deprived of
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and from certain disadvantages or penalties imposed because a person
is a newcomer to an area.' It has been suggested that the right also
includes "migration with the intent to settle and abide."'30 A right to
settle and abide would imply that if a municipality prohibited a class
of citizens from moving within its boundaries and living there, it would
infringe on the right to travel. A federal district court used similar
reasoning in Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma.'3'
The court declared, "[Tihere is no meaningful distinction between a
law which 'penalizes' the exercise of a right to travel and one which
denies it altogether."' 31 In Petaluma, the court used the right of travel
to invalidate a municipal ordinance which limited population growth
through restrictions on the number of building permits, thus excluding
"substantial numbers of people who would otherwise have elected to
immigrate into the city.' 31 3 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
ruling and sustained the ordinance without considering the merits of the
travel argument, since the plaintiff landowners and developers did not
have standing to raise the travel argument.'
4
In addition to the right to settle and abide, courts also have focused
on restrictions which deprive persons of a necessity of life or a funda-
mental right because they have exercised their right to travel.'35 Most
travel cases have not been pure restrictions on physical movement.
Courts have held that the right to travel was infringed when residency
requirements affected other important interests, including voting, 3 6 free
federal rights, including the right to travel, when whites threatened them on interstate
highways.
129. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (holding that
a one-year residency requirement to receive non-emergency hospitalization and medical
care at county expense violated the right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (striking a residency requirement as a prerequisite for welfare benefits as infringing
on the right to travel).
130. Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st Cir. 1970) (invalidating a New-
port, Rhode Island Housing Authority regulation that limited public housing eligibility
to those who had been Newport residents for two years). Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
39, 42 (1915) (voiding an Arizona statute which prohibited an employer from employing
aliens for more than 20% of his work force). Cf. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 36-37
(1966).
131. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975).
132. Id. at 582.
133. Id. at 581.
134. The court did point out, "Assuming arguendo that the constitutional right to travel
applies to this case, those individuals whose mobility is impaired may bring suit on their
own behalf . Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 904 (9th
Cir. 1975).
135. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
136. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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association,"7 and "necessities of life."' 3 In a right to travel case involv-
ing welfare benefits, the Supreme Court noted that shelter is among the
"necessities of life."'"" In extending the analysis to shelter homes, the
question centers on whether excluding rehabilitation facilities or the
persons who would be housed in them is a deprivation of a necessity of
life. The answer would depend, in part, on the availability of alternate
housing. If there were no alternatives available, a rehabilitation facility
would be a necessity.'4 It might be argued that a second alternative
would be to keep the persons in a state hospital, but those who do not
pose a danger to themselves or others may not be involuntarily con-
fined. 4 ' The necessity' 2 of housing in shelter homes for those who have
137. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), invalidated the Secretary of State's regulation
prohibiting the issuance of passports to Communists. In dictum, the Court strongly sug-
gested the regulation violated protections of free association and the due process right to
travel. Cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
138. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating a residency
requirement to receive non-emergency medical care at county expense); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (invalidating a one-year residency requirement as a prere-
quisite to welfare benefits which, the court pointed out, pay for food, shelter, and other
necessities of life).
139. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
140. For example, if a state, for budget or other reasons, releases persons who although
not ill, cannot completely care for themselves, those persons will need a place to stay. If
they do not have families or friends to whom they can go, a rehabilitation facility may be
the only alternative. Thus, it is a necessity of life for those persons-a necessity which
relates to the right to travel. The "necessity" argument would not be as strong for adult
and juvenile offenders for whom alternatives could include continued imprisonment or
complete release. In the case of neglected and abandoned children, however, the only
viable alternative might be foster homes, which are usually best located in single-family
districts.
141. The power of the state to confine a person in a mental institution has been limited
by O'Connor v. Donaldson, 442 U.S. 563 (1975). The Court held that it is a deprivation of
liberty if a state involuntarily confines a person, who is not a danger to himself or others,
in a custodial institution. Dr. LeRoy Levitt, Director of the Illinois Department of Mental
Health, said O'Connor would have little effect on state mental health practices, since
Illinois patients are not held involuntarily without treatment unless they are a danger to
themselves or others. Chicago Sun Times, June 28, 1975, at 50, cols. 1-4.
142. Aside from the necessity argument, it would be unfair to the individuals who
should be able to return to the freedom and enjoyment provided by community life when
illness no longer requires hospital treatment. Traveling for reasons of health is favored by
the Court. In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the Court struck
down a residency requirement which was a condition for eligibility for non-emergency
medical care at county expense, saying, "A person afflicted with a serious respiratory
ailment . . . might well think of migrating to the clean dry air of Arizona, where relief
from his disease could also bring relief from unemployment and poverty." Id. at 257. By
similar reasoning, it could be argued that a person afflicted with a moderate mental
disorder might well think of moving to a community facility to obtain relief from his
affliction and reintegration into society.
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no alternative housing seems as strong as the "necessities" of welfare
benefits' and non-emergency medical care at county expense"-
neither of which can be denied by discriminating against those who
have exercised their right to travel. This combination of necessity with
the right to travel creates a constitutional right not to be excluded from
rehabilitation facilities.
C. Due Process-Irrebuttable Presumption
Another constitutional principle which could be asserted on behalf of
persons excluded from rehabilitation facilities is the doctrine of
"irrebuttable presumption."'45 Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court
has held that it is a denial of due process to base a classification on "a
permanent and irrebuttable presumption . . . when that presumption
is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has
reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination."' 46
Application of the doctrine to rehabilitation facilities occurs when a
municipality attempts to exclude an entire class of persons or facilities
on the basis that such persons or facilities would be a danger or nuis-
ance. Such an assumption is over-inclusive and would not be "univer-
sally true in fact." To draw such an assumption about an individual or
group of individuals without personalized evaluation could be construed
as a violation of due process. The administrative convenience of such
assumptions is not a sufficient reason to exclude an entire class of per-
sons, especially when reasonable alternatives for making the crucial
determinations are available.'47 An example of a reasonable alternative
would be a system of screening persons before they are admitted to a
community rehabilitation facility. 4 ' Such a system may not be perfect,
143. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
144. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
145. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Cf. United States Dep't of Agriculture
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
Vhandis was the first case explicitly to use "irrebuttable presumption." It involved a
Connecticut statute which created an irrebuttable presumption of non-residency for the
purpose of determining tuition rates for students who lived out-of-state at the time of
application. Thus, a student who lived out-of-state at the time of application was forced
to pay a higher tuition rate, even if he moved to Connecticut before school started with
the intent of taking up permanent residence. The Court said this was a denial of due
process.
146. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
147. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 451 (1973).
148. At the Ridgeview Shelter Care Home, there is a three-step screening procedure
before a person is admitted. First, there is a referral and recommendation from a state
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but it better serves the rights of persons who need facilities, as well as
the need for community safety.
IV. CONCLUSION
As mental health and corrections officials place greater reliance on
community rehabilitation facilities, the courts will be required to bal-
ance the rights and needs of communities, the state, and persons who
live in the facilities. People have a right to be treated and evaluated as
individuals. Part of the spirit of a democratic society is the tolerance of
some abnormality and the willingness to give an individual a second
chance. A person may look different, walk strangely, and even behave
bizarrely, but that person ought not to be excluded from a community
unless he poses a real danger.
Persons who plan to open facilities should make greater efforts to
inform and gain the support of the community in which the facility will
be located. Knowledge can diminish fear, and community support will
aid the goal of reintegration. If a community has a legitimate complaint
about a facility, the courts can shape remedies to protect the needs of
community safety, the residents of the facility, and the public-at-large.
The answer is not to ignore the problem or send it somewhere else, but
to deal with it with understanding and creativity in our own communi-
ties.
Jeff Atkinson
institution. Second, the applicant for admission is evaluated by a committee of represen-
tatives from the Ridgeview staff and the Illinois Department of Mental Health. The com-
mittee reviews the applicant's general information sheet, psychological examination, so-
cial history, and other materials. If any one of the committee members objects, the appli-
cant is not admitted. Third, the applicant is given a tour of the facility and interviewed
by a member of both the Ridgeview staff and the Illinois Department of Mental Health.
If agreeable to all, the applicant is admitted. Abstract for Appellant at 137-38, City of
Evanston v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 64 Ill.2d 40, 349 N.E. 2d 399 (1976). If a resident is
found to be incompatible with the home or community, the resident is sent to a more
appropriate facility. City of Evanston v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 64 Ill.2d at 59, 349 N.E.2d
at 410.
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